



STUDY GUIDE:

NATO

(NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION)

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LETTER FROM THE EB

Greetings Delegates, We formally welcome you to the committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation! NATO is itself a premiere international body entrusted with maintaining peace and security and creating harmony among Europe and America. It is no small feat to grasp the way this committee functions along with dealing with such complex agendas. The way we have structured committee this time is slightly different and more nuanced so the delegates have the chance to witness and be a part of the chief policy-making body of the organisation itself.

Collective defense and counter-terrorism operations have both been at the forefront of NATO policy discussions and for good reason. The first stems from a statute embedded within the founding charter; however in recent years it has faced considerable backlash from foreign countries for being too aggressive and the possibility that it has been and could be further misused to gain a significant advantage by the member states in hostile regions.

The possibility of its invocation still stands looking at the current geopolitical climate and must be handled very delicately. The latter is equally important as NATO has to evolve along with growing security threats across the continents- be it from an unfriendly nation or extremist groups threatening to cause a serious loss of livelihood.

The Executive Board has a shared experience spanning multiple MUNs, as chairs and as delegates. Moreover this type of committee is one that we are quite excited about, and we cannot wait to meet the delegates and witness exceptional debate. Please feel free to reach out to us regarding any questions or queries about the committee.

We wish you the best of luck!

Sincerely,
Your Executive Board



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2. ABOUT TO THE COMMITTEE

NATO is an alliance of countries from Europe and North America. It provides a unique link between these two continents, enabling them to consult and cooperate in the field of defense and security, and conduct multinational crisis-management operations together.

Security in our daily lives is key to our well-being. NATO'S purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. On the political side of things, NATO promotes democratic values and enables members to consult and cooperate on defense and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict. Taking the military aspect of it, the organization is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. If diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military power to undertake crisis management operations. These are carried out under the collective defense clause of NATO's founding pact- Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or under a United Nations mandate, alone or in cooperation with other countries and international organizations.

So far, Article 5 has been invoked once- in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001.

Strategic concepts lay down the Alliance's core tasks and principles, its values, the evolving security environment and the Alliance's strategic objectives for the next decade. The 2022 Strategic Concepts reaffirms that NATO's key purpose is to ensure the collective defence of its members, based on a 360 degree approach, and outlines three core tasks- deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management and co-operative security.

For the duration of the conference we shall be running committee as a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, given the gravity of the agendas put forth. The North Atlantic Council is the principal political decision-making body within NATO. It oversees the political and military process relating to security issues affecting the whole Alliance.



It brings together representatives of each member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions, providing a forum for wide-ranging consultation between members on all issues affecting their peace and security. Council discussions and decisions cover all aspects of the Organisation's activities and are often based on reports and recommendations prepared by subordinate committees, at the Council's request.

Policies decided in the NAC are the expression of the collective will of all member countries of the Alliance since decisions are made on the basis of unanimity and common accord. The Secretary General chairs the NAC and its decisions have the same status and validity at whatever level it meets. It was the only body established by the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 9) in 1949 and the only one with the authority to set up subsidiary bodies. The NAC meets at least every week and often more frequently, at the level of Permanent Representatives; it usually meets twice a year at the level of ministers of foreign affairs, three times a year at the level of ministers of defense, and occasionally at summit level with the participation of heads of state and government. However, this frequency can differ depending on the need of the Organization to discuss international developments and events.

Permanent Representatives act on instruction from their capitals, informing and explaining the views and the policy decisions of their governments to their colleagues around the table. Conversely, they report back to their national authorities on the views expressed and positions taken by other governments, informing them of new developments and keeping them abreast of movement toward consensus on important issues or areas where national positions diverge. Each country represented at the Council table or on any of its subordinate committees retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions.

Direct support to the Council is provided by the Secretary of the Council, who ensures that Council mandates are executed and decisions recorded and circulated. A small Council Secretariat handles the organizational and logistical aspects of the NAC's work, while the relevant divisions of the International Staff support the work of committees reporting to the NAC.

Generally speaking, the entire International Staff at NATO Headquarters supports the work of the Council, either directly or indirectly, and helps to ensure that Council decisions are implemented.



3. AGENDA I: INTERPRETING THE AMBIT OF THE COLLECTIVE DEFENCE POLICY AND THE USE OF ARTICLE V OF THE NATO CHARTER

3.1 The Washington Treaty of 1949

Only 14 articles long, the Treaty is one of the shortest documents of its kind. The carefully crafted articles were the subject of several months of discussion and negotiations before the Treaty was actually signed. However, once Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States had discussed these issues, they agreed on a document that would establish the North Atlantic Alliance.

On 4 April 1949, the 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty at the Departmental Auditorium in Washington D.C., the city which lends its name to the Treaty.

The Treaty committed each member to share the risk, responsibilities and benefits of collective defense – a concept at the very heart of the Alliance. In 1949, the primary aim of the Treaty was to create a pact of mutual assistance to counter the risk that the Soviet Union would seek to extend its control of Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent. The Treaty also required members not to enter into any international commitments that conflicted with the Treaty and committed them to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Moreover, it stated that NATO members formed a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

In addition to collective defense and key values, the principle of consensus decision-making and the importance of consultation define the spirit of the Organization, together with its defensive nature and its flexibility.



Formal public treaty negotiations began on 10 December 1948 with the Ambassadors Committee in Washington, D.C. For these talks, Luxembourg sent its own representative. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were later invited to the final sessions of negotiations, which began on 8 March 1949. Although the participating countries agreed that collective defense would be at the heart of the new Alliance, several other issues were still not resolved and needed to be worked out before the formation of the Alliance could become a reality.

Collective defense -

Views on the implementation of Article 5 differed. The United States had previously taken a stance of officially avoiding foreign entanglements. It was concerned that Article 5 would draw the country into a conflict through treaty obligations. Something had to be put in place to allow for the United States to send aid to attacked countries without having to declare war.

The European countries, on the other hand, wanted to ensure that the United States would come to their aid if one of the signatories came under attack.

Political and Military Cooperation -

Some drafters wanted more than just military cooperation between signatories. They wanted to expand cooperation to social and economic cooperation, but there were differing views on how to treat non-military issues. Ultimately, Article 2 went through, and now forms the basis of the Alliance's political and non-military work. Article 2 is reinforced by Article 4, which encourages the Allies to "consult together" whenever they consider it necessary, therefore facilitating consensus-building. The practice of regularly exchanging information and consulting together strengthens the links between governments and knowledge of their respective preoccupations so that they can agree on common policies or take action more easily.

Geographical Scope of the Alliance -

The geographical scope of the Alliance in terms of area of responsibility was yet another topic on which the negotiators had a difference of opinion. The United States and the United Kingdom saw NATO as a regional organization while other countries, such as France, felt it should take on a more global role.

Article 6 of the Washington Treaty details what is understood by the Alliance's geographical scope-



“For the deemed purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an attack:

- On the territory of any of the Parties in in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- On the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer”

Membership of the Alliance -

In terms of whom to invite to join the Alliance, again the drafters held diverging views. The United Kingdom wanted to keep the Alliance small and strong, avoiding commitments to peripheral countries, while the United States advocated inviting countries that were more likely to fall to Soviet aggression. France, on the other hand, was mainly concerned with protecting its colonial territories. Of concern to all three countries was Germany, whose membership was not immediately considered due to the complexity of its situation. The drafters also discussed inviting Italy, Greece, Türkiye, Portugal, Iceland and the Scandinavian countries, essentially for their strategic value. Italy, Portugal and Iceland were among the founding members and ultimately Greece and Türkiye joined the Alliance in 1952. Iceland linked its membership to that of Denmark and Norway, which were also among the founding members in 1949; Sweden, on the other hand, refused to have any links with NATO because of its strong commitment to neutrality. Consideration was also given to offering membership to Ireland, Iran, Austria and Spain, but the idea was dropped largely due to internal conditions in each country.

Duration of the Treaty -

The negotiating countries disagreed on how long the Treaty should last. Some countries favored a long-term agreement that would set the initial duration at 20 years, while others feared that anything beyond 10 years would be seen as an unnecessary extension of the war effort. Finally, at the insistence of Portugal, the Treaty was made valid for a 10-year period, after which the Treaty could be reviewed (Article 12); and only after the Treaty had been in force for 20 years could a member withdraw from the Organization (Article 13).



To date, these two provisions have never been used, i.e., the Treaty has never been reviewed nor a member withdrawn from the Organization.

Preamble- *“The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :”*

3.2 Issues with Article V

Sixty years later, Article 42(7) was incorporated in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as the EU's 'mutual defense clause', part of a cluster of articles relating to the 'progressive framing of a common Union defense policy'. Substantial uncertainty remains over the interpretation of Article 42(7). Following its first and only invocation in 2015, after the November terrorist attacks in Paris, debate intensified on how it works in practice, its scope, the definitions of 'armed aggression' and 'territory', and which forms of aggression it applies to.

Experts note that Article 42(7) 'leaves more room for interpretation than one might expect from a clause in a legally binding text'. Many experts hoped that the Strategic Compass would deliver clarification, however that did not occur. Comparisons of the two articles point to a number of differences. First, according to some views, the EU's mutual assistance pledge can be seen as more strongly formulated, in that EU Member States have an explicit obligation to come to the defense of the victim state, and that they have to do so by 'all means' in their power, not just the means they think are necessary. Article 42(7) is thus, according to that analysis, of a much 'more compelling nature'. Second, according to legal experts, the threshold to invoke – armed aggression (Article 42(7)) as opposed to an armed attack (Article 5) – is lower in international law. Not every act of armed aggression reaches the threshold of an armed attack triggering the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. For instance, according to an expert view, a naval blockade of a harbor would constitute armed aggression but not necessarily an armed attack. However, others suggest the reference to 'armed aggression' may just be the result of a 'literal translation of the French text', rather than signifying a broader scope.



Third, in terms of scope, while Article 5 applies to all NATO members in the same manner, Article 42(7) TEU states that 'this shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States'. This is commonly understood to give 'special status' Member States (e.g. neutral states Malta, Ireland and Austria) an opt-out from mutual defense assistance. Article 5 has no such opt-out. For Article 5 to be applicable, an armed attack has to occur on the territory of a NATO member. The territorial limitation of Article 5 is found in Article 6, which delimits the area in which the armed attack has to take place (North America, Europe and other clearly defined areas north of the Tropic of Cancer). However, it sets no geographical limit on where Article 5 counter-actions may take place. If, for example, Article 5 is triggered by an armed attack on a NATO member's soil, academics maintain that there is no inherent legal impediment to NATO carrying out collective self-defense measures in a third country, even as far away as Singapore. Article 42(7) does not entail any such strict geographical limitation. By referring to 'its [Member State's] territory', it would seem to refer not only to continental Europe but could have worldwide applicability. Questions also remain about the applicability of Article 42(7) to the hybrid, cyber and space domains, while NATO leaders established at the 2022 Madrid Summit that Article 5 is applicable in those domains. The November 2022 EU cyber-defence policy does note that, in cases of significant cybersecurity incidents, Member States 'need to be able to draw on mutual assistance- in the context of Article 42(7)'.

If the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's highest decision-making body, reaches a consensus determining that an armed attack has occurred within the North Atlantic area, NATO Member States are obliged to assist the victim member. However, academics posit that this obligation is caveated by the fact that it falls to each country to decide how exactly it will respond. Still, this discretionary element does not remove the fact that NATO members must determine the necessary action in good faith, so their response cannot be manifestly unreasonable (e.g. sharing redundant information after Russia carries out an armed attack on a NATO member). In terms of Article 42(7), when first invoked after the 2015 attacks in Paris, Member States clarified that 'no formal decision or conclusion by the Council will be required to implement Article 42(7)'. The French Minister of Defence referred to the invocation of Article 42(7) as a 'political act' and the then EU High Representative underlined that no 'further formality' was needed to launch mutual assistance. Therefore, in practice, no formal requirement to adopt a decision to trigger Article 42(7) has been established. In terms of what 'aid and assistance by all the means in their power' means, a lot remains uncertain.



Some experts note this has been deliberately left 'ambiguous' to accommodate neutral and non aligned Member States. When France invoked the article, requests and offers of assistance were discussed and organized bilaterally rather than through the EU, and took various forms.

The draft annual report on common security and defense policy (CSDP), currently under discussion in Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, stresses the need to make Article 42(7) TEU operational in the short run and to clarify the coherence between the EU's Article 42(7) and NATO's Article 5. In its 2021 annual report on CSDP, Parliament urged Member States to reach an 'ambitious common understanding' on Article 42(7), including in a hypothetical cyber-attack scenario. It also underlined that the conditions for activation of the article and the modalities of the assistance required have not been clearly defined.

3.3 The Current Collective Defence Policy

NATO members' commitment to mutual defense has been the cornerstone of the alliance since it was established by the Washington Treaty in 1949. Article 5 of the treaty commits each individual member state to (1) view an armed attack against one or more members as "an attack against them all" and (2) assist the party under attack by taking "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force" to restore and maintain regional security. Article 5 was originally motivated by concerns that the Soviet Union would seek to expand its control of the European continent. However, there was never a conventional Soviet attack on a NATO member. The language of NATO's charter preserves a degree of flexibility for allies, stipulating that "each . . . will assist . . . by taking . . . such action as it deems necessary." Members are not required to respond to an attack with armed force. However, for many years, it was a common assumption within the alliance that a conventional attack on any NATO member would elicit a military response from the entire alliance. Although Article 5 can be invoked by NATO government representatives at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to initiate collective action as an alliance, it can also be invoked by any NATO member, even in the absence of NAC consensus. To date, the only instance in which NATO has invoked Article 5 was in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States. Following the invocation, NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft flew more than 360 missions over U.S. skies, with more than 830 crew members from 13 allied nations.



For allies, including Germany, NATO's Article 5 decision drew alliance considerations to the forefront of public national security discourse. This shift might have contributed to the fact that 15 of 18 NATO allies ultimately contributed forces to NATO operations in Afghanistan, even though it was not an Article 5 mission. Alliance members can also invoke NATO's Article 4, under which NATO allies will "consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." While largely viewed as a political mechanism, Article 4 consultations have been seen as a step toward invoking collective defense commitments under Article 5 and have sometimes resulted in limited military activity. When Turkey invoked Article 4 during the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, NATO flew AWACS missions and deployed Patriot batteries on Turkish territory for several weeks.

NATO allies—including the United States, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands—also deployed Patriot batteries to Turkish soil following Turkey's invocation of Article 4 over the escalating war in Syria. Similarly, the 2014 Russian attack on Ukraine prompted Poland and Lithuania to invoke Article 4. Immediate NATO military responses included a temporary expansion of NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission and the deployment of NATO's Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 to the Baltic Sea. Since that time, allies have bolstered NATO's military presence in Europe's east through the establishment of rotating multinational battlegroups in Poland and each of the Baltic states.

In a crisis with Russia, allies would begin consultations under Article 4 or could move immediately to discussions about invoking Article 5. In either case, members would have to consider their political, economic, and military responses. Politically, NATO members could support, abstain from a vote on, or oppose an official NATO response. Should NATO be unable to reach political consensus, each state would need to consider whether to support a coalition of the willing operating outside of the NATO structure. Allies might also consider making financial contributions to support a response. Each state would also need to decide whether and how to contribute to any military response. A military response does not necessarily involve the use of force; it might involve such action as sending troops to a NATO country to deter an attack. In either case, an ally might choose not to participate, make a small contribution as a symbolic show of unity, or be a leading member of the military response. However, the magnitude of the contribution is not the only way that allies can tailor their contributions.



As discussed in Chapter Two, allies are likely to weigh a number of factors, such as the risk of Russian retaliation, as they decide how to respond. In response to this complex and potentially countervailing set of considerations, allies might try to vary other characteristics of their military contribution, such as whether the contribution is observable, its military utility, and the ease of reversing the military contribution. For example, a state that feels strong alliance pressure to contribute but worries about Russian retaliation might be more likely to provide intelligence analysis; such analysis might not be easily detected by Russia, reducing the likelihood of retaliation.

3.4 Public Opinion about Military Responses and Alliance Commitments

Public opinion on foreign policy is shaped by many forces. First, public opposition to the use of force in general can be driven by history and culture. Polls have indicated divisions between the United States and European countries on public support for the use of force.

A 2013 German Marshall Fund poll asked respondents in ten European countries and Turkey whether force was “sometimes necessary to obtain justice”: Only 31 percent responded in the affirmative. In the United States, by contrast, 68 percent of those asked the same question responded in the positive.⁵ Even among European countries, these historical and cultural factors can vary. A 2014 German Marshall Fund poll found significant divergences between the willingness of various European publics to use military force to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. The poll found that the French (70 percent), Portuguese (67 percent), and Spanish (59 percent) publics were most willing to support the use of military force against Iran if all other options failed, in contrast to a slim majority in Germany (51 percent) that supported accepting a nuclear Iran if military action were the only available alternative.

Variation in public views about the use of force among NATO members could also be seen in decisions about participation in Operation Unified Protector in Libya. Although Canada did not have a clear national security imperative to intervene, its commitment to NATO and desire to uphold the “responsibility to protect” norm drove its participation. In contrast, Germany’s preference for non-military solutions dominated the parliamentary discussions and resulted in Germany’s decision not to contribute troops to the operation. These findings suggest that NATO members are likely to vary in their underlying predisposition to adopt a military response.



Second, public views about the use of force can be affected by situational factors, such as the purpose of the intervention. Studies of U.S. public opinion have found greater support for using force to protect the homeland or another state from aggression than to change another country's internal politics. Related research indicates that public opinion can shift rapidly when the context changes. A sudden, dramatic attack—such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or the September 11 terrorist attacks—not only heightens public interest in foreign policy but also can radically alter the willingness of a public to enter into armed conflict. This research suggests that even though the public might express low willingness to use force in a hypothetical Russian attack, the new conditions that arise from an actual attack could shift public opinion. For NATO members that already have deployments in the Baltics, an attack on NATO forces, if clearly attributable to Russia, could shift public attitudes in support of a military response. Third, elites can influence public attitudes on foreign policy issues. If elites across political lines support contributing to a NATO operation, they might be able to gain public support. A 2016 study of domestic support for NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission to Afghanistan found that plausible, coherent, and consistent narratives were at least partially effective in reducing public opposition in allied countries.

In Germany, Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg's narrative surrounding the 2009 Kunduz air strike reportedly contributed to passive acceptance of Germany's role by an otherwise critical German public. In another example, the German government appealed to core themes of German political culture to strengthen public support for German contributions to NATO's 1999 operations in Kosovo: aversion to state aggression (in this case, Serbian aggression), affinity for multilateral responses (in this case, NATO), and prioritization of human rights. Political elites could also reduce support for NATO operations. In the Netherlands, a robust 2010 campaign for withdrawal from Afghanistan by the Labor Party and opposition Freedom Party might have strengthened public skepticism about the mission; the resulting political crisis ultimately caused the 2010 collapse of the Dutch government. As we will discuss in subsequent sections, the electoral rise of new political figures in NATO governments that promote populist, nationalist, and anti establishment messages have challenged a traditional elite consensus on NATO. These voices could serve to exacerbate existing doubts within NATO publics about national contributions to an alliance mission. Public views on the use of force are highly context dependent, which makes them difficult to predict in advance of a crisis. Moreover, it is elite perceptions of public opinion, which can differ from actual public opinion, that have been shown to determine outcomes.



Further complicating matters, the effect of public opinion on foreign policy choices can depend on a government's electoral vulnerability and the extent of elite consensus on foreign policy.

3.5 Alliance Politics

A state's assessment of the cost and benefits of a military response could also be affected by considerations that are specific to the alliance itself. In general, two broad concerns tend to pervade alliance politics: the risk of dissolution or abandonment (that the alliance itself will fall apart or that key allies will withdraw their commitments) and the risk of entrapment (the possibility of being dragged into a conflict unnecessarily).⁶² A state's decision to participate in a NATO response could be affected by how it balances these concerns. Any scenario that presumes an informal coalition of the willing rather than a formal NATO response complicates calculations about the costs and risks of dissolution or abandonment. On the one hand, even in the absence of a formal NATO mandate, some allies might see a lack of coalition participation as a betrayal of NATO commitments and decide to punish nonparticipants in some way. This would be most likely in a case of a conventional Russian attack on a NATO member. In a more ambiguous scenario, some allies might have strong opposition to the operation and seek to punish those that operate outside of NATO auspices. Countries could therefore plausibly face countervailing pressures from allies.

A military response in the Baltics could be conducted by a coalition of the willing made up of NATO and non-NATO partners acting outside of the NATO alliance. Although there is no legal restriction on independent action outside of NATO, some members see NATO's norms of consultation and consensus building as essential features of the alliance. As a result, they might seek to deter or punish those who would break that norm. Punishment by non coalition allies seems unlikely in the event of a conventional attack on a NATO member. However, it could be more plausible in an unconventional scenario in which Russian intentions and Article 5 commitments are less clear. Punishment by non coalition allies seemed possible in the run-up to the Iraq War, when disputes over whether to support the U.S. drive to war with a "coalition of the willing" grew heated within Europe. For example, when the "Vilnius 10"—a group of Eastern European aspirants to the European Union (EU)—wrote a letter supporting U.S. operations, France threatened that such irresponsible behavior could cost them EU membership.



Alliance Politics and Decisions to Support a Military Response -

	More Likely to Adopt a Military Response	Less Likely to Adopt a Military Response
Participation of other allies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Militarily powerful allies are involved, making success more likely 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Militarily powerful allies are not participating
Alignment of goals among participants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State's goals for the operation are aligned, especially with leading allies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State has much less ambitious goals than leading allies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimal concerns about provocations by frontline states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State has concerns about provocation by frontline states
Ability to restrain coalition members	State expects allies will be restrained within coalition decision making structure	State believes some allies will ignore coalition concerns or operate unilaterally
Consequences of alliance dissolution or abandonment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State is reliant on NATO for security and expects punishment for non-participation 	State is not reliant on NATO for security or does not expect NATO punishment for non-participation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State deeply values NATO for other non-security reasons 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State does not deeply value NATO
Punishment by non coalition allies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non participants are few or plan to stay neutral 	Many non participants that intend to punish defectors



3.6 Questions of Ambit and Interpretation

Despite the transatlantic agreement on the new common threats, there are significant differences between the United States and its allies over appropriate responses. Most allied governments contend that the Administration places excessive emphasis on military over political means to counter a threat, and that the allies have other domestic budget priorities (such as pension plans) that compete with allocations for defense.

The allies' response to the Bush Administration's doctrine of "pre-emptive attack" in the face of an imminent threat captures elements of the transatlantic debate over response to the threat. The Administration's National Security Strategy notes that the United States reserves the right to take military action "to forestall or prevent... hostile acts" by an adversary. While most allies would concede such a right, some view the doctrine as an example of U.S. unilateralism at the moment of U.S. global military pre-eminence. In general, they believe that military action must be undertaken within a multilateral framework. The allied debate over pre-emptive attack has been affected by the U.S. decision to terminate UN weapons inspections and to go to war against Iraq in March 2003, a conflict Administration officials indicate was undertaken to prevent the Hussein regime from developing and using weapons of mass destruction against the United States and other countries. The initial refusal by France, Germany, and Belgium to approve NATO military assistance to Turkey in February 2003 in anticipation of a possible attack by Iraq sharply divided the alliance. The three allies contended that such assistance would amount to tacit approval of a U.S. belief that war with Iraq was necessary. Most allies said then, and maintain now, that a UN resolution is a requisite step, whenever possible, for NATO military action.

The inability of the Bush Administration to locate WMD in Iraq has led to renewed insistence among the European allies that their opposition was correct and that a UN imprimatur should be sought for NATO operations.

Allied insistence on involvement of international institutions in "legitimizing" conflict has its origins in the aftermath of the 20th century's two world wars. Europeans remain wary of arguments justifying the crossing of borders and resorting to military action. Establishment of the United Nations in 1946, under U.S. leadership, was one means to ensure that international diplomatic and public opinion could be brought to bear to enhance understanding of an impending danger and how to respond to it.



Atlantic Treaty's reliance on the consensus method of decision-making was another. The allied debate over pre-emptive attack, out-of-area engagement, and "legitimization" of military operations has been brought to a head by the Bush Administration's frustration with cumbersome alliance decision-making procedures.

The Administration believes that NATO military actions should mostly be conducted by "coalitions of the willing." In this view, the allies, of which only a small number have deployable forces capable of high-intensity conflict, should use coalitions of member states that agree upon a threat and have the means to counter it. Most European allies believe that "coalitions of the willing" would undermine the solidarity of the alliance and the consensus decision-making principle. Their support for the principle of consensus centers upon a desire to maintain political solidarity for controversial measures. In this view, the consent of sovereign governments, each taking an independent decision to work with other governments, is a formidable expression of solidarity and in itself provides a measure of legitimization for an operation. Some allies believe that this view was given weight, for example, in NATO's decision to go to war against Serbia in 1999 when Russian resistance prevented passage of a UN Security Council resolution approving intervention on behalf of Kosovo.

The Notion of Collective Defense -

As a matter of international law, collective defense is an exceptional measure. It is a circumstance that "precludes the wrongfulness" of a use of force by a State acting defensively, as well as any States coming to its defense. In other words, it renders lawful what would otherwise be a violation of the most fundamental prohibition of international law. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is a manifestation of this ground for the preclusion of wrongfulness vis-à-vis both the use of force against another State and non-compliance with other international law prohibitions and obligations, such as the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered the right of collective self-defense in the 1986 Nicaragua case. Pointing to the term "inherent right" in the text of Article 51, as well as General Assembly resolutions like the Resolution on Friendly Relations, the Court found the right to be customary in nature.



Indeed, it has been invoked on many occasions, some merited, others a subterfuge for intervention. For instance, collective self-defense was the justification for:

- (1) U.S. action in Lebanon in 1958;
- (2) US action in Vietnam between 1961 and 1975;
- (3) Soviet involvement in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan in 1968 and 1979 respectively;
- (4) support by the United States and its partners of Kuwait following Iraq's 1990 invasion; and
- (5) Coalition support of US Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014.

Collective defense may be exercised in a number of ways. It encompasses coming to the assistance of a State that is engaged in self-defense, even to the point of providing the entire defense of that State. Defensive aid may be provided:

- (1) By a single State;
- (2) Multiple individual States operating separately in support of the victim State;
- (3) An ad hoc coalition of States operating collaboratively; or
- (4) A standing multinational military organization, such as NATO. Provision of collective defense by a standing multinational organization offers a number of key benefits. They include the advance training of military forces from member States that may be called upon to operate together, development of joint doctrine, establishment of command-and-control relationships, cooperation in the building of national force structure and the acquisition of equipment, the sharing of military facilities, and joint and combined planning in anticipation of an armed attack.

The establishment of NATO and the vesting of it with collective defense responsibilities under Article 5 makes possible the realization of these benefits.

Armed Attack -

The determinative condition precedent to the exercise of either self or collective defense is the occurrence of an "armed attack." Obviously, the meaning of the term as used in Article 5 cannot be broader than that which applies to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.



The question is whether it enjoys a narrower meaning. It would appear not, for the references in the 2010 Strategic Concept and the Brussels Summit Declaration to terrorism, cyber-attacks, and hybrid warfare confirm that Article 51 is understood as extending to all armed attacks, however launched, employing whatever means and of whatever scale. The dilemma is that no conclusive definition of the term “armed attack,” as used in Article 51 or customary law, exists in international law. Nevertheless, in its Nicaragua judgment, the ICJ noted that there “appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks.”

Nevertheless, in its Nicaragua judgment, the ICJ noted that there “appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks.” Despite the Court’s failure to offer guidance as to the content of that agreement, there is broad consensus that an attack resulting in significant physical damage or injury would qualify.

Beyond that consensus lie two quandaries. The first deals with the requisite gravity of the underlying use of force against which the defensive action is taken. In Nicaragua, the Court distinguished between “the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) [and] other less grave forms.” The only example provided to illustrate the difference was that of a “mere frontier incident,” which would qualify as a use of force but not an armed attack. This example provoked controversy, and rightfully so since most States would be unlikely to conclude they are prohibited from responding with force to a penetration of their border by another State’s armed forces. Further, the Court seemed to signal that the gap between a simple use of forces.

Further, the Court seemed to signal that the gap between a simple use of force and an armed attack was relatively narrow when, in its 2003 Oil Platforms judgment, it was unwilling to exclude the possibility that using naval mines against a single warship would qualify as the latter. It is accordingly problematic to identify a precise threshold of severity at which the NAC could lawfully invoke Article 5.

Further complicating matters is the fact that the United States has long taken the position that no distinction is to be made between the threshold for violation of the use of force prohibition and that applying to the right of self-defense against an armed attack. In its view, every use of force is equally an armed attack, although no other Ally has expressly adopted this position.



As a result, it is uncertain how the NAC would respond to a U.S. request to invoke Article 5—or to one by another Ally—in a situation involving a relatively low-level use of force. This situation might well arise with respect to the second quandary related to the notion of armed attack, the treatment of hostile cyber operations against a member of the Alliance. NATO has adopted the stance that should cyber operations qualify as an armed attack; the victim State would be entitled to request invocation of Article 5 by the NAC. This position is in accord with the generally accepted view that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter applies in the cyber context.

The challenge lies in identifying those cyber operations that would qualify. General consensus exists that a cyber operation causing significant injurious or physically destructive consequences would amount to an armed attack. The unanswered question is whether one having severe albeit neither injurious nor physically destructive effects could ever constitute an armed attack and, if so, under what circumstances.

For instance, may a State treat a cyber operation that causes widespread and severe disruption to its economic system as an armed attack? Or do hostile cyber operations that seriously interfere with the functioning of critical cyber infrastructure qualify as such if the interference has not caused injury or physical damage? States have been extremely hesitant to express *opinio juris* on the matter. Among the Allies, Dutch Minister of Defence Ank Bijleveld has offered the most direct comment. Speaking at an event to mark the first anniversary of the publication of the Tallinn Manual 2.0, the Minister cited cyber operations causing “serious disruption with long-lasting consequences.” She explained, “for instance, if a cyber-attack targets the entire Dutch financials system...or if it prevents the government from carrying out essential tasks such as policing or taxation...it would qualify as an armed attack...and...trigger a [S]tate’s right to defend itself even by force.”

As reflected in the Minister’s comments, States are likely to focus on the severity of the consequences generated by the hostile cyber operation, rather than their nature—e.g., destructive or nondestructive—or the mechanism causing them—kinetic or cyber—when considering whether to characterize them as an armed attack. But until States start publicly to add texture to the discussion, the NAC will inevitably have to employ a “know it when I see it” approach to invoking Article 5 in cases of cyber incidents lacking injurious or destructive effect.



Further, a question that has animated discourse as to the scope of the right of self-defense is whether a hostile operation launched by non-State actors from abroad—domestic terrorism is not encompassed in the international law right of self-defense—can ever qualify as an “armed attack,” such that the victim State may respond at the use of force level on the basis of the law of self-defense.

Complicating matters is a degree of uncertainty regarding whether Article 5 itself allows for anticipatory self-defense. Sylvain Fournier and Lewis Bumgardner have perceptively noted, for instance, that the provision does not include the word “inherent” that is found in Article 51 of the Charter. They query whether this signals that Article 5 was intended to be limited to situations fitting squarely within the textual four corners of Articles 5 and 51, even if anticipatory self-defense was permissible under customary—inherent—international law when the North Atlantic Treaty was drafted. Although such an interpretation is colorable, the better position is that no distinction can be read into Article 5 between the inherent customary right of self-defense and the separate treaty-based right reflected in Article 51, to which Article 5 refers. It must be recalled that two Allies, Italy and Portugal, were not members of the United Nations in 1949—both joined in 1955. If the absence of reference to the “inherent right” in Article 5 had been meant to limit the provision’s application to those armed attacks encompassed in Article 51 as read without the term “inherent,” those two Alliance members, as non-Parties to the U.N. Charter—with its reference to the inherent right—would have fallen outside Article 5’s protective scope altogether. This cannot have been the drafters’ intent; therefore, it seems clear that the Article 5 reference to Article 51 necessarily was meant to encompass defensive rights, including anticipatory self and collective defense, under both Article 51 and customary law.

In support of this conclusion, note that the International Court of Justice observed in its Nicaragua judgment that the inherent right does not differ materially from its treaty-based analogue. Indeed, the mainstream view in international law remains that both Article 51 and customary international law admit of a right of anticipatory self-defense. For example, this was the position taken by the U.N. High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004. Accordingly, Article 5 can best be characterized as having included, and still including, a right of anticipatory self and collective defense. NAC authorization of operations on the basis of anticipatory collective defense might be fraught with political obstacles.



The Requisite Agreement -

A decision to invoke Article 5 is taken by the NAC, which consists of Permanent Representatives of all the Allies, but that also sometimes meets at the Foreign Minister, Defense Minister or Head of State or Government level. The NAC's decision-making authority does not depend upon the level at which it meets and its decisions are taken by consensus pursuant to a "silence procedure" in which there is no vote on a proposal, but a single objection "breaks the silence" and therefore blocks the decision.¹⁷⁰ In such a decision-making system, individual members exercise exceptional power with respect to the invocation of Article 5, for a single Ally may block NATO from taking action in the face of an unambiguous, even devastating, armed attack on a member of the Alliance. As noted, such discretion was the cost of securing U.S. Congressional support for the North Atlantic Treaty after being drawn into two world wars in Europe in less than half a century.

This risk that an Ally might exercise its authority to block Article 5 action has grown measurably since 1949. Originally, the States that comprised the Alliance were relatively homogenous and faced a single shared existential threat from the Soviet Union and its satellites. Today, the group is geographically, culturally, religiously and politically diverse, having expanded over the years into the Mediterranean region, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Of course, the more diverse the Alliance in terms of perspective and national interests, the more difficult it will be to achieve consensus on what is the most significant decision a State can take in international relations—the decision to resort to armed force. Failure of the NAC to achieve consensus regarding whether to invoke Article 5 would not bar the Alliance's members from defending themselves in individual self-defense. Nor would it preclude other Allies from coming to its defense outside the North Atlantic Treaty framework pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international law.

But a decision by the NAC that an armed attack has occurred would not release a State from its individual obligation under Article 51 of the Charter to only engage in collective defense if an armed attack is on-going or imminent and the use of force to defend against that attack is both necessary and proportionate. This is because U.N. Charter obligations enjoy primacy over those contained in the other treaties, including the North Atlantic Treaty. Further support for this premise is found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that "[w]hen a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail."



In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty, this principle appears in Article 7's confirmation that the provisions of the instrument do not affect the U.N. Charter rights and obligations of its Parties. At least in theory, therefore, a State employing force pursuant to a NAC collective defense decision could be acting unlawfully if the invocation of Article 5 was without basis in international law.

Scope of the Commitment-

Article 5 requires that Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty consider an attack against one or more of them to be an attack upon them all and assist the victim(s) either by providing assistance directly or in collaboration with other States. However, it caveats this obligation with the phrase "such action as it deems necessary." This is a rather complicated formulation, as the "will assist" text in the Article 5 is expressed as an obligation, while the decision of how to assist is textually left to individual Allies. The distinction begs the question of whether an Alliance member may agree that an armed attack has occurred and subsequently decide it is not necessary to provide any assistance or that only assistance falling short of that considered necessary by the other Allies is needed.

Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that the provisions of the instrument are to be "carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." Thus, even if a State has not blocked invocation of Article 5 in the NAC, the decision on committing forces and, if so, how to do so, may be subject to domestic law processes and authorities. In the United States, limitations are found, for instance, in Article I of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power of the purse and the rights to declare war, raise armies and maintain a navy, as well as in legislation like the War Powers Act, and Authorization for the Use of Military Force. The precise parameters of these limitations may be the subject of debate, but there is no question that Congress could act, in part, to limit the scope and degree of U.S. collective defense measures in response to the NAC's Article 5 invocation

Such discretion has led to disagreement over the nature of Article 5 and similar commitments. In response to Michael Glennon's claim that these arrangements represent an "element of non-committal in the commitment," Aurel Sari asserted, "a legal commitment to act nonetheless exists." Perhaps the best view is that a State acting in good faith pursuant to the principle *pacta sunt servanda*, as is required by the law of treaties, must not block invocation of Article 5 when an armed attack unambiguously occurs against a member of the Alliance.



Following invocation, each Ally similarly must act in good faith in seeking to fulfill its collective defense obligation under Article 5 by providing necessary support. This was the sense of Senate Foreign Relations Committee when considering the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949: “These words were included in article 5 to make absolutely clear that each party remains free to exercise its honest judgment in deciding upon the measures it will take to help restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”¹⁸⁹ However, should constitutional or other domestic law obstacles stand in the way of it doing so, an Ally will not be in breach of Article 5 should it fail to offer assistance.



3.7 CONCLUSION

Understanding the scope and content of Article 5 has proven increasingly challenging over the past seventy years as the regional and global security environment became ever more complex and multifaceted. At its inception, Article 5 was most likely to operate in an environment in which war clouds would appear on the horizon well in advance of an armed attack and in which conflict would occur conventionally across geopolitical borders. That is no longer the case. The attack to which Article 5 action responds may come without warning; the first blow could be cataclysmic; non-State actors may attack without the involvement of any State; an attack could involve weapons of mass destruction; the conflict might commence, or even remain entirely within, a virtual domain; and the decision-making structure of the Alliance requires consensus among more than double the original number of Allies, and that group of States has become far more diverse. Such transformations have rendered a common legal understanding of the parameters and content of Article 5 ever more elusive; they do not inspire sanguinity.



4. AGENDA II: IMPROVING COOPERATIVE SECURITY AND EXPANDING COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS

4.1 How the NATO Counter-Terrorism system works

Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity. It is a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion, and is a challenge that the international community must tackle together. NATO will continue to fight this threat with determination and in full solidarity. NATO's work on counter-terrorism focuses on improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors. This system works under three main pillars-

Awareness: The most prominent body under this pillar is the Joint Intelligence Security Division, within which the Terrorism Intelligence Cell has been established.

Terrorism Intelligence Cell: In 2015, NATO established the Terrorism Intelligence Cell (NIC) in response to the escalating terrorism threat. The task of gathering, processing, and disseminating information on terrorist threats to NATO member nations is carried out by the NIC, a small but expanding group of intelligence specialists. The following reasons led to the establishment of the NIC:

- i. The increasing sophistication and lethality of terrorist groups
- ii. The rapid growth in the number of terrorist attacks in NATO countries and its respective allied nations
- iii. The need for NATO to improve its ability to share intelligence on terrorism threats.

The NIC is headquartered in NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The Director of the NIC is chosen by the NATO Secretary General. A workforce of about 100 individuals from NATO member states work for the NIC.

The NIC's missions are:

- i. To gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on terrorism threats to NATO member states
- ii. To provide support to NATO member states in their efforts to combat terrorism



iii. To promote cooperation between NATO member states on terrorism intelligence

The NIC's objectives are to:

- i. Improve NATO's ability to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks
- ii. Enhance NATO's understanding of extremist threats
- iii. Promote cooperation between NATO member states on terrorism intelligence

1. Capabilities- Defence against terrorism programme of work

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) created the Defense Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW), which was then endorsed by NATO Leaders at the Istanbul Summit in 2004. The program's early emphasis was mostly on technological ways to lessen the effects of terrorist attacks, but it has now expanded its scope to promote the development of comprehensive capabilities. It now comprises drills, tests, the creation of conceptual prototypes, equipment development, doctrine, policy, lessons learned, training, and interoperability demonstrations. The main goals of the DAT POW are to reduce additional problems such as attacks on critical infrastructure and prevent non-conventional attacks like attacks using IEDs and UAS.

Some examples of projects undertaken by DAT POW-

Combatting improvised explosive devices (C-IED): In any land or marine operation involving asymmetrical threats, NATO must continue to be ready to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with force protection remaining a top priority. Several NATO organizations, like the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Centre of Excellence in Madrid, Spain, are in charge of the Alliance's operations to combat IEDs. In particular, stand-off detection has been investigated as a potential technology to combat IEDs. The biennial Northern Challenge exercise, which is directed by Iceland and evaluates IED disposal and counter-IED capabilities, is supported by the DAT POW. Two cutting-edge strategies that the DAT POW frequently supports are the biennial Thor's Hammer electronic countermeasures trial series and the radio-controlled IED database, which are now also being used to help defeat unmanned aircraft systems.

Combatting unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS): In their activities, terrorists have attempted to employ and manipulate a variety of technologies, including readily accessible off-the-shelf technology. Particularly drones have been noted as a threat.



Therefore, a practical framework to combat unmanned aircraft systems was approved by NATO Defence Ministers in February 2019.

The implementation of a new work program that was agreed upon in 2021 to help coordinate strategies and develop further measures to mitigate this threat. Through tests, evaluations, exercises, concept development, and technical standardization, the DAT POW promotes the development of C-UAS capabilities in their entirety. A challenge for the development of artificial intelligence and machine learning methods to track, categorize, and identify drones as they fly across a certain area was supported in 2021 by the DAT POW.

2. Engagement- Cooperation with partner nations and international organizations is the main focus of the engagement pillar.

NATO works to understand what each partner needs from the organization and its members and the areas in which NATO can help through what is referred to as counterterrorism dialogues. It assists each nation in developing a program of training, assistance, research initiatives, and so on using all the resources available in the NATO inventory to support them based on this analysis of their needs and our capabilities. The organization also attempts to include some of those nations in NATO's work on capabilities where appropriate because the NATO community of partners is large and includes nations with a range of degrees of experience.



4.2 Problems with current NATO Counter-Terrorism ventures

in its anti-terrorism efforts, NATO is faced with a number of difficulties. These include:

- How the threat from terrorism is constantly changing. It is challenging for NATO to maintain a lead because terrorist organizations are constantly changing their strategies.
- Lack of a common understanding of what constitutes terrorism. It is challenging for NATO to coordinate its efforts with those of other nations and organizations because there is no accepted definition of terrorism.
- The difficulty in preventing terrorist attacks. It is challenging to identify and stop terrorist attacks because they are frequently carried out by small, self-organized cells.
- The need to strike a balance between security and civil liberties
- It can be difficult to strike the right balance when taking anti-terrorist measures because they frequently violate civil liberties.

In terms of sharing intelligence, NATO faces a number of difficulties in combating terrorism. These comprise:

- Different legal systems: The gathering, sharing, and application of intelligence is governed by various legal frameworks in each NATO member state. Because each NATO member may have different policies regarding what information can be shared and with whom, it may be challenging for NATO members to exchange information.



With regard to various legal frameworks, NATO is faced with a number of challenges in its fight against terrorism. A few of these difficulties are:

- Terrorism's lack of a widely agreed-upon definition: There isn't a single, widely accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism. This makes it challenging for NATO to create a coordinated strategy to combat terrorism
- The various legal frameworks used to combat terrorism. The legal systems that apply to countering terrorism vary between nations. Because of this, NATO may find it challenging to coordinate its efforts with those of other nations.
- The challenge of striking a balance between security and human rights. Sometimes anti-terrorist measures can violate people's rights. NATO needs to carefully strike a balance between the need to defend human rights and the need to protect its citizens from terrorism.
- Terrorist attacks on NATO members are a possibility. The threat of terrorism is always present for NATO members. As a result, NATO finds it challenging to completely protect its members from terrorism.



4.3 NATO's Cooperation with Other Countries

NATO has been successful in cooperating with other countries in a number of ways. These include:

- **Peacekeeping operations:** NATO has been involved in a number of peacekeeping operations, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These operations have helped to stabilize these regions and prevent further conflict.
- **Counter-terrorism:** NATO has also been involved in counter-terrorism efforts, both within its own borders and in other parts of the world. These efforts have helped to disrupt terrorist networks and prevent terrorist attacks
- **Disaster relief:** NATO has also provided disaster relief to countries affected by natural disasters, such as the 2005 Pakistan earthquake and the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami. This assistance has helped to save lives and rebuild communities.
- **Security cooperation:** NATO has also worked with other countries to improve security cooperation. This includes sharing intelligence, training together, and conducting joint exercises. This cooperation has helped to strengthen NATO's ability to deter and respond to threats.

NATO's cooperation with other countries has been essential to its success. These partnerships have helped NATO to achieve its goals of peace, security, and stability. In addition to the above, NATO has also cooperated with other countries in a number of other areas, including:

- **Defense reform:** NATO has worked with partners to reform their defense institutions and make them more effective. This has helped to improve the ability of partners to contribute to NATO operations.



NATO's cooperation with other countries has been essential to its success. These partnerships have helped NATO to achieve its goals of peace, security, and stability. In addition to the above, NATO has also cooperated with other countries in a number of other areas, including:

- Defence reform: NATO has worked with partners to reform their defense institutions and make them more effective. This has helped to improve the ability of partners to contribute to NATO operations.
- Counter-proliferation: NATO has worked with partners to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This has helped to reduce the risk of these weapons being used and has made the world a safer place.
- Cyber security: NATO has worked with partners to improve cyber security. This has helped to protect NATO's networks and systems from attack.

NATO's cooperation with other countries is essential to its future success. These partnerships will help NATO to adapt to the changing security environment and meet the challenges of the 21st century.



5. SUGGESTED CAUCUS TOPICS

Agenda 1:

1. Discussing the current self defence policy
2. Discussing the legislation governing Article V and its ambiguities
3. Discussing the power dynamic among member states within NATO and its effect on the kind of collective defence adapted
4. Discussing the true ambit of Article V in scenarios of conflict leading to possible application
5. Interpreting Article V in a thematic sense and proposing its possible reformation

Agenda 2:

1. Discussing the ways of further identification and prevention global threats by extremist organizations across Europe and North America
2. Expanding counter-terrorism operations across fields
3. Facilitating ways for a clearer system of information exchange between member states on security operations and newer threats
4. Endorsing the development of newer technologies and defence systems with the aim of protecting its military units in hostile regions
5. Discussing policy guidelines governing NATO counter-terrorism operations and reforming them

**Delegates are to keep in mind that they must go above and beyond just discussing these topics and introduce nuance into debate; as well as understanding that these are pertinent questions the EB looks for answers to in the committee's final paperwork*



6. RESEARCH GUIDANCE

Agenda 1

- https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm
- [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/739250/EPRS_ATA\(2022\)739250_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/739250/EPRS_ATA(2022)739250_EN.pdf)
- <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/07/politics/what-is-nato-article-5/index.html>
- <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/15/what-is-article-5-nato/>
- https://www.researchgate.net/profile/JamesGoldgeier/publication/265024172_Global_NATO/links/584d9e5e08aecb6bd8c9aeb0/Global-NATO.pdf
- <https://nato.usmission.gov/about-nato/>
- <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato>

Agenda 2

- https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm
- <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/tags/%C2%A0nato>
- <https://www.mod.gov.lv/en/nato/nato-capabilities/nato-counter-terror>
- <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2015/volume-2/6-nato%E2%80%99s-role-in-counter-terrorism-by-juliette-bird.pdf>
- <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA585205.pdf>
- https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_212612.htm?selectedLocale=en



7. POSITION LETTER

A position paper presents an arguable opinion about an issue. The goal of a position paper is to convince the audience that your opinion is valid and worth listening to. Ideas that you are considering need to be carefully examined in choosing a topic, developing your argument, and organizing your paper.

It is very important to ensure that you are addressing all sides of the issue and presenting it in a manner that is easy for your audience to understand.

It is important to support your argument with evidence to ensure the validity of your claims, as well as to address the counterclaims to show that you are well informed about both sides.

In the context of a Model UN committee, it is simply a document presented to the Executive Board before the conference that details your country's stance on an agenda i.e your 'position' on a certain situation. We ask for this as it helps us have an estimate of a delegate's caliber beforehand and showcases how well of a grasp one has on the topic

Guidelines:

- I. Two separate papers for the two agendas
- II. The text should be in Times New Roman with font size 12
- III. It must be sent as a Word document
- IV. 1.5-3 page limit
- V. Must be submitted a week before the conference- no papers sent in after 23:59 pm on 2nd August shall be accepted and marked.

Mail it to natohfsmun23@gmail.com

GOOD LUCK, GODSPEED, AND MAY THE FORCE BE WITH YOU